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Abstract 
Those countries, including the United Kingdom, using force in Libya in 2011 have 
taken much greater care to ensure that their actions are underpinned by legality. This 
suggests a return to respect for the jus ad bellum, but as the operation against Libya 
unfolded it became clearer that some of the problems that undermined the legality and 
legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq eight years earlier had not been avoided, which raises 
the question of how such operations can be kept within the strict bounds of the law. 
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1. Introduction 
In mid-February 2011 within the wider context of unrest and revolution in North Africa 
and the Middle East an uprising began against the regime of Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi, ruler of Libya since 1969. The uprising gained momentum but was resisted by 
the regime and forces loyal to him, violence increased, leading to an internal armed 
                                                          
 Professor of Public International Law, University of Nottingham, UK. This article is based on evidence 
given to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 31 March 2011. This 
article was completed towards the end of June 2011 while the Libyan revolution and operation was, 
contrary to initial expectations, still in progress. 
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conflict between rebels with their base in the eastern city of Benghazi, and Gaddafi 
forces from their stronghold in the western capital of Tripoli.  The imbalance between 
the sides (particularly in heavy weaponry and attack aircraft), and the reported 
systematic attacks on unarmed civilians by government forces, led to debate in Western 
capitals about the imperative of protecting civilians, initially primarily by means of the 
imposition of a no-fly zone aimed at preventing Gaddafi’s airforce from attacking 
civilians, but the hidden pretext was to stop his forces blocking a successful rebellion.   
The main protagonists in favour of the use of military force against Libya, France and 
the UK, were mindful of the lessons from Iraq, both in terms of the legality of the 2003 
invasion (when the main protagonists were the UK and the US) and its state-building 
consequences. This short article considers, from the British perspective, whether those 
lessons have resulted in a use of force in 2011 against Libya, the legality and legitimacy 
of which is a significant improvement on the use of force in 2003 against Iraq.  While 
the evidence presented at the Iraq Inquiry being held in the UK strongly indicates that 
the use of force against Iraq was unlawful,1 the UK has taken much greater care in 2011 
to ensure that its actions against Libya are underpinned by legality. This suggests a 
return to respect for the jus ad bellum by the UK, but as the operation against Libya has 
unfolded it has become clear that some of the problems that undermined the legality 
and legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq have not been avoided, which raises the question 
of how such operations can be kept within the strict bounds of the law. Nevertheless, 
with politicians in the UK debating the use of force in the Spring of 2011, almost exactly 
eight years after the invasion of Iraq, they are looking back to that controversial episode 
to learn crucial lessons, including lessons about the importance of international law. 
 
                                                          
1 UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced the establishment of the Iraq Inquiry in the House of 
Commons on 15 June 2009, its terms of reference being ‘to consider the period from summer 2001, 
before military operations began in March 2003, and the UK’s subsequent involvement in Iraq up to the 
end of July 2009.  The Prime Minister told the House of Commons: “the Iraq Inquiry will look at the 
run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction.”  The objective is to learn the lessons 
from the events surrounding the conflict’—http:iraqinquiry.org.uk/faq.aspx. See evidence given to the 
Inquiry by Sir Michael Wood, Foreign Office Legal Adviser in 2003, on 26 January 2010, 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43614/100126am-wood.pdf; and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Deputy 
Legal Adviser at the FCO in 2003—http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/44211/20100126pm-
wilmshurst-final.pdf. Both considered the use of force against Iraq in 2003 to be illegal as a matter of 
international law. For Lord Goldsmith’s (the Attorney-General at the time) more equivocal evidence of 
27 January 2010 see http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43803/100127-goldsmith.pdf. 
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2. UN Security Council Resolutions on Libya 
Prior to the use of force by aircraft drawn from member states of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), on 26 February 2011 the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) unanimously agreed to the imposition of an arms embargo against the 
whole of Libya and of targeted sanctions against Gaddafi and his supporters in the form 
of an assets freeze and travel ban.2 That Resolution (1970) also referred the situation in 
Libya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) after considering that the widespread and systematic attacks taking place in Libya 
may amount to crimes against humanity. Without any sense of irony the Resolution 
decided that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with the ICC, while 
recognizing that states not party to the Rome Statute on the ICC (including the USA, 
Russia and China from the five permanent members of the Security Council – P5) have 
no obligations under the Statute. 
Considerations that a travel ban and a referral to the ICC may well have made Gaddafi 
more intransigent and trapped did not prevail, and with the Libyan authorities failing to 
adhere to the obligation to end the violence imposed by Resolution 1970, but also at a 
point when Gaddafi’s forces were about to attempt the recapture of Benghazi from rebel 
forces, the UK, France, the US and Lebanon persuaded the UNSC to authorise military 
action in Resolution 1973 on the 17 March 2011.3 This Resolution’s provenance can be 
traced back to the Korean War in 1950 and Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when the 
UNSC authorised US-led Coalitions of the Willing to deal, by taking necessary 
measures (UN-speak for the use of military force), with breaches of international peace 
and security.4 This form of authorization has been recognized in UN practice and in 
most jurisprudence as a lawful delegation of power to member states to take military 
action under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the Charter, to deal with threats to or breaches 
of the peace as a recognised exception, along with the right of self-defence, to the ban 
on the threat or use of force in the UN Charter.5 
                                                          
2 UNSC Res. 1970, 26 February 2011. 
3 UNSC Res. 1973, 17 March 2011. 
4 UNSC Res. 83, 28 June 1950; UNSC Res. 678, 29 November 1990. 
5 Arts. 2(4), 42 and 51 of the UN Charter. For discussion see N.D. White and O. Ulgen, ‘The Security 
Council and the Decentralized Military Option: Constitutionality and Function’, XLIV NILR (1997) p. 
378; N. Blokker, ‘Is Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the United Nations Security 
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by Coalitions of the Able and Willing’, 11 EJIL (2000) p. 541. 
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In Resolution 1973, after repeating its statement in Resolution 1970 that the Libyan 
government had the responsibility to protect the population, the UNSC authorized 
member states to take all necessary measures, ‘to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack’ in Libya, ‘including Benghazi, ‘while excluding 
a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’. As is common 
with such authorizations to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter, the obligation 
on member states to the UNSC was a reporting one, in this case to the United Nations 
Secretary General (UNSG), of the measures taken pursuant to the resolution.  
Resolution 1973 also imposed a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace ‘in order to help protect 
civilians’, and authorized member states ‘to take all necessary measures to enforce 
compliance’ with the no-fly zone. 
Resolution 1973 thus contained an enforceable no-fly zone, a measure that had been 
mooted since early in the crisis, but it also allowed NATO states to go further and take 
military action to protect civilians, leading to an on-going debate in the UK as to 
whether this could include, for example, the targeting of Gaddafi himself on the basis 
that he was the ultimate source of the problem for civilians.6 When an armed conflict 
is occurring between states or within a state, as is the case in Libya where there is both 
an internal armed conflict between rebels and government forces and an international 
one between Libya and the ‘Coalition’ or ‘Allies’ acting under Resolution 1973, then 
soldiers and their commanders are legitimate targets under the laws of war,7 and in this 
sense Colonel Gaddafi is a legitimate target, but the law of war is not the only legal 
regime applicable here. Indeed it is arguably qualified by the UNSC resolution which 
authorised the prosecution of the war,8 and which does not so readily bear such a wide 
                                                          
6 At Prime Minister’s Question Time on 23 March 2011, the leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband asked 
the Prime Minister to ‘clarify the Government's position on the targeting of Colonel Gaddafi? It is 
important that we stick to the terms of the UN resolution as we seek to maintain the coalition we have 
built on that resolution’. In response David Cameron stated that ‘all our targets must be selected to be 
absolutely in line with UN Security Council resolution 1973. That allows us to take "all necessary 
measures" to enforce a no-fly zone and to put it in place as safely as possible as well as to take action to 
protect civilian life. All targets should be in line with that but I do not propose to give a running 
commentary on targets or, frankly, to say anything beyond that’, Hansard, HC, Vol. 525, Col. 943, 23 
March 2011. NATO clearly targeted Colonel Gaddafi and senior members of his regime – see 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13846128, 20 June 2011. 
7 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 88-94. 
8 On the overriding effects of Article 103 see R. Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the 
United Nation Charter’, 57 ICLQ (2008) p. 583 . This has been interpreted too broadly by UK Courts as 
overriding inconsistent human rights obligations in R (Al Jedda) v Secretary of State of Defence [2007] 
UKHL 58.   
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interpretation. Indeed, at the UNSC meeting at which Resolution 1973 was adopted,9 
there was controversy surrounding the common understanding of the Resolution 
suggesting that great caution should be exercised when subsequent attempts are made 
to place meanings on it that are difficult to reconcile with the text and background to 
the Resolution; bearing in mind the paragraph in the Resolution that authorized the 
protection of civilians was seemingly added late to the text to enable NATO forces to 
stop what appeared to be an imminent and brutal attack by Gadaffi forces on Benghazi. 
Thus even though there was a clear and current authorization to use force against Libya 
in Resolution 1973, there were shades of the debate that occurred in 2003 in relation to 
Iraq concerning the interpretation of older resolutions going back to Resolution 678 of 
1990.10 Nevertheless, there is a vast difference between the argument made by the UK 
in relation to Iraq in 2003, namely that a 1990 authorization to use force to implement 
Security Council resolutions in the context of removing Iraq from Kuwait was still a 
valid authority thirteen years later for invading Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein as 
well as his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD);11 and the interpretation of a 
Resolution adopted in March 2011 sanctioning necessary measures to protect civilians 
and enforce a no-fly zone, which was being implemented by states within a week of its 
adoption by the UNSC.  
The legal basis for the Libyan action is exponentially so much stronger, but the Libyan 
operation has not eliminated some fundamental problems of the UN collective security 
‘system’ so starkly revealed by the Iraq crisis of 2003. The system is rudimentary and 
depends upon political consensus between the P5 being present, which it was in March 
2011, but not in March 2003; but that precious Resolution of 2011 (1973) was, at the 
time of writing, likely (though not definitely),12 to be the only source of authority for 
                                                          
9 UNSC 6498 mtg, 17 March 2011. 
10 N.D. White, ‘The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq’, 17 LJIL (2004) p. 645. 
11 See the Attorney General’s advice given to the House of Commons immediately prior to the invasion 
on 17 March 2003, which was to the effect that the authority to use force against Iraq given in SC 
Resolution 678 (1990) was revived by a material breach by Iraq of Resolution 1441 (2002) and earlier 
disarmament resolutions—see Hansard HC, Vol. 401, Col. 760, 18 March 2003 when Prime Minister 
Tony Blair relied on this argument in proposing a substantive vote. The Attorney General’s full advice 
was not released until 28 April 2005, in which, in contrast, he concluded that ‘if the matter ever came 
before a court’, that court ‘may well’ conclude that Resolution 1441 did require a ‘further Council 
decision in order to revive the authorization in’ Resolution 687; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/apr/28/election2005.uk, 28 April 2005.  
12 See discussion about the EU possibly seeking UNSC authority for a humanitarian aid military mission 
– EUFOR Libya – at the beginning of April – The Guardian Weekly, p. 5, 2 April 2011. 
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the use of force against Libya and therefore was subject to greater and greater demands 
placed upon it, potentially stretching the Resolution beyond its meaning and contrary 
to the collective understanding of  that resolution. The problem is that the veto-
dominated negotiating system is too unwieldy to allow nimble executive responses to 
constantly changing security situations. This means that decisions on implementation 
of Resolution 1973 take place at the regional level in NATO, or between France and 
the UK, or indeed within the political systems of each and every state contributing to 
the air campaign over Libya.13 While this is to be expected, the absence of any control 
at the UN level is at the same time both alarming and unsurprising.14 
During the UNSC meeting on the 17th March at which Resolution 1973 was adopted,15 
the unanimity behind  Resolution 1970 was broken, but not to the extent of disabling 
the adoption of Resolution 1973 by 10 votes to 0 with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, Russia). Those abstaining were not only the usual advocates of non-
intervention (China and Russia) but equally important states, each with a strong case 
for permanent membership themselves. The change within the UNSC from the situation 
in Kosovo in 1999 where the UNSC could not agree on military action to protect the 
Kosovars,16 to Libya in 2011 is marginal, but sufficient to give the initial action a sound 
legal basis. That marginal push may have been helped by the emergence in the early 
21st century of the idea that there is a responsibility to protect (R2P) on the part of the 
international community, when a state has failed to protect its population from crimes 
                                                          
13 In a letter to national newspapers in France, the UK and US, President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron 
and President Sarkozy made it clear that ‘our duty and our mandate under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi by force. But 
it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power. The International Criminal Court is 
rightly investigating the crimes committed against civilians and the grievous violations of international 
law. It is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their 
future government. The brave citizens of those towns that have held out against forces that have been 
mercilessly targeting them would face a fearful vengeance if the world accepted such an arrangement. It 
would be an unconscionable betrayal’ - available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13090646, 
15 April 2011. 
14 Towards the end of June 2011 there had been 8 further formal meetings of the UNSC on Libya since 
the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973 on 17 March. These consisted of briefings by the UNSG, the  
representative of the UNSG, the Chairman of the Committee established by UNSC Resolution 1970, the 
prosecutor of the ICC, by UN officials on humanitarian aid and post-conflict rebuilding, and by the AU 
– see UNSC 6505th mtg, 24 March 2011; 6507th mtg, 28 March 2011; 6509th mtg, 4th April 2011; 6527th 
mtg, 3 May 2011; 6528th mtg, 4 May 2011; 6530th mtg, 9 May 2011; 6541st mtg, 31 May 2011; UNSC 
6555th mtg, 15 June 2011.  
15 UNSC 6498th mtg, 17 March 2011. 
16 See UNSC Res. 1199, 23 September 1998; UNSC Res. 1203, 24 October 1998. Neither resolution 
expressly authorised ‘necessary measures’ to protect the people of Kosovo. 
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against humanity or other similar egregious acts.17  The UN World Summit Outcome 
Document of 2005 placed this responsibility squarely on the UNSC if a state had failed 
to protect its population. 18 Both UNSC Resolution 1970 and 1973 on Libya stated in 
the preamble that the Libyan authorities bore responsibility to protect the population of 
Libya, which could be seen as a reference to R2P, though tellingly neither Resolution 
went on to state that since the Libyan government had failed to protect its population, 
the UNSC had a responsibility to do so. Instead, the UNSC makes it clear in Resolution 
1970 that its responsibility is for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
its traditional concern, making no reference to any other form of responsibility it might 
have.  Thus while there is no doubt that the Libyan crisis will be lauded as a precedent 
for R2P, the Resolutions themselves do not bear such an interpretation.  
It is informative to look at the reasons given by those abstaining on Resolution 1973. 
Germany expressed concern about being drawn into a protracted conflict and about the 
intervention causing more harm than it might prevent. India could not vote for the 
Resolution because of lack of clear information on the ground, and lack of clarity about 
the enforcement measures to be taken under Resolution 1973. Brazil’s concern was that 
the resolution went beyond a no-fly zone, which was the measure being discussed up 
until that point, and was also concerned that the measures taken to protect civilians 
would cause more harm than good to those very people. Russia criticised the way in 
which the draft resolution ‘morphed’ before the eyes of Council members by going 
beyond a no-fly zone, and criticised the drafters for not answering questions about rules 
of engagement and limits on the use of force. China was generally against use of force 
in international relations, but because of regional support from the Arab League for a 
limited form of intervention as well as the special circumstances of Libya, had decided 
not to vote against. Thus there were clear warnings to NATO states to be careful about 
the nature and extent of their military operations.  Just as the US and the UK should 
have heeded the concerns of many members of the Security Council when Resolution 
1441 was adopted in November 2002 in the build-up towards military action by those 
states against Iraq, to the effect that the Resolution did not provide for the use of force,19 
                                                          
17 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect 
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001);  Report of the High Level Panel on 
‘Threats, Challenges and Change’ (UN, 2004), recommendation 55; Report of the UNSG, ‘In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Freedom for All’ (UN, 2005), para. 135. 
18 UNGA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005, para. 139. 
19 UNSC 4644th mtg, 8 November 2002. 
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so NATO states in the bombing campaign over Libya should heed the concerns of the 
members of the authorizing body as to the extent of the use of force. 
Having said that Resolution 1973 does allow for greater use of force than was 
anticipated in the build-up to its adoption. From the initial debates about an enforced 
no-fly zone, the end result was an authorization to undertake a much greater use of force 
– necessary measures (mainly in the form of bombing) to protect civilians, necessitated 
by the imminent attack on Benghazi, thereby bringing it much closer to the military 
action over Kosovo in 1999 though that had not been authorised by the UNSC.20 UNSC 
Resolution 1973 was rushed through even more quickly than is the norm, and promised 
much debate about its interpretation and meaning.  The use of force by NATO planes 
towards the end of March and beginning of April seemed to be increasingly directed at 
supporting the rebels and in several respects went beyond the protection of civilians as 
mandated in Resolution 1973, by for example targeting battle tanks, though the 
argument was that these were being used to attack civilians and not simply in the fight 
against the rebels.21 What started out in appearance at least, though not so evident in 
political rhetoric or in the UNSC Resolutions themselves, as an application of the 
emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine,22 seemed by mid-June to be  heading 
towards another instance of regime change as in Iraq in 2003, with all the problems that 
entailed. 
 
3. The UK and Libya 
Early debates within the UK Parliament reflected this potential change in interpretation 
of Resolution 1973. Parliamentary debates on decisions to deploy troops to conflict 
zones have been shown by this writer elsewhere to provide a strong indication of the 
                                                          
20 Supra n 16. 
21 In a TV interview the Prime Minister stated that the terms of UNSC Resolution 1973 made it difficult 
for NATO forces though they would stick to the terms of the Resolution, but this would allow them ‘to 
actually take out Gaddafi's tanks and artillery and command and control that are unleashing this hell on 
people in Misrata in Brega, and other towns up and down the Libyan coast’ - 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13107834, 17 April 2011. 
22 On the responsibility to protect doctrine see C. Focarelli, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine’, 13 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2008) p. 191.  
9 
 
attitude towards international law within the political establishment in the UK.23 This 
is not so much a search for opinio juris in a classical sense, but an examination of a 
particular state’s understandings of, and in broad terms respect for, international law. 
Given the UK’s leading role in many of the recent uses of force, including Iraq in 2003 
and Libya in 2011, that understanding and respect becomes all the more important. This 
section will consider the debates on Libya within Parliament in March –June 2011 to 
discern what lessons had been learned from the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
On 28 February 2011, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, informed the House of 
Commons as to how the UK would implement Resolution 1970, but also mentioned 
that the government was planning for different scenarios including a no-fly zone.24 On 
Friday 18 March following the adoption of Resolution 1973, the Prime Minister 
informed the House about the implementation of that Resolution, and spoke about the 
urgency of the situation and the imminent attack on Benghazi where Gaddafi had 
threatened to show no mercy. 25 At this stage the Prime Minister was clear that 
Resolution 1973 had limits; to protect civilian and civilian populated areas and did not 
permit an occupation force in any form.26 He repeated this when asked, with Iraq in 
mind, about the problem of how UNSC Resolutions had been misinterpreted in the 
past.27  
Furthermore, the Prime Minister informed the House that the Cabinet had been given 
clear legal advice from the Attorney General, which he summarised for the House in 
terms that Resolution 1973, as a Chapter VII resolution clearly authorising necessary 
measures to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly zone, was a legally recognised basis 
on which to deploy and use force.28 However, that legal advice did not appear to address 
the subsequent interpretation of Resolution 1973 and did not go to issues such as when 
force could be used to protect civilians; whether the arms embargo imposed in UNSC 
Resolution 1970 could be breached in favour of the rebels; and the issue of legitimate 
                                                          
23 N.D. White, Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments under International Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009); N.D. White, ‘International Law, The United Kingdom and Decisions to 
Deploy Troops Overseas’, 59 ICLQ (2010) p. 814. 
24 Hansard HC, Vol. 524, Cols. 23-26, 28 February 2011. 
25 Hansard HC, Vol. 525, Col. 611, 18 March 2011. 
26 Ibid., Col. 612. 
27 Ibid., Col. 628 (Mark Tami MP). 
28 Ibid., Col. 613 (David Cameron MP).  Legal advice available at 
http://www.politics.co.uk/features/foreign-policy/legal-advice-on-libya-mission-in-full-
$21387896.htm, 21 March 2011. 
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targets.  Resolution 1973 stated that force could be used ‘to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack’, which suggested that the standard was 
somewhat wider than self-defence of third parties, which usually requires an imminent 
attack,29 but not as wide as simply destroying any military target on the basis that it 
might be the source of a future attack against civilians.  David Cameron was asked by 
one MP whether the phrase in UNSC Resolution 1973, where necessary measures to 
protect civilians were authorized ‘notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970’, 
which had imposed the arms embargo against the whole of Libya, would permit the 
arming of the rebels.30 The Prime Minister thought that the arms embargo was still in 
place for the whole of Libya and not just against the government.31 
One lesson from Iraq that does not seem to have been accepted in the Libyan crisis by 
the British government was the need for full advice on the international legal basis of 
the operation being made available to the House of Commons and not just to the 
Cabinet, before any debate leading to a vote in Parliament, in order to enable MPs to 
make an informed decision. Arguably such legal advice should draw upon wider 
expertise to ensure that it is balanced and represents an accurate view of international 
law to avoid the problems of Iraq, where there emerged several versions of the Attorney 
General’s advice.32 It is anticipated that the Iraq inquiry will show that most 
international lawyers in the UK agreed that the military action in Iraq in 2003 was 
unlawful,33 yet the advice given to Parliament immediately before the invasion was that 
it had a clear legal basis.34 In contrast to Iraq, there is a clear Chapter VII resolution, 
Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force in the case of Libya. Though a summary 
of the Attorney General’s legal advice on the current action in Libya was released the 
process still seems the same as in Iraq in 2003. Though the legal basis is clear – a 
chapter VII resolution authorising necessary measures to protect civilians and to 
enforce the no-fly zone - the legal advice does not anticipate the many problematic 
issues of interpretation and application that remain and were clearly foreseeable at the 
                                                          
29 G. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and Why (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008) pp. 63-72. 
30 Hansard HC, Vol. 525, Col. 627, 18 March 2011 (William Cash MP). 
31 Ibid., (David Cameron MP). 
32 Supra n 11. 
33 See the Iraq Inquiry’s invitation to international lawyers to make submissions on the legal basis of the 
2003 military action against Iraq available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/background/100602-
submissions-from-international-lawyers.aspx, 24 June 2011. 
34 Supra  n 11. 
11 
 
time of the Resolution’s adoption. Unfortunately, the Attorney General’s legal advice 
did not appear to be the full legal advice necessary for Parliament to make informed 
decisions. 
During the initial Parliamentary debate David Cameron stated that the government ‘will 
table a substantive motion for debate next week, but I am sure that the House will accept 
that the situation requires us to move forward on the basis of the Security Council 
Resolution immediately’.35 Unlike in the case of Iraq where the slow build up to conflict 
allowed for a substantive vote in the House of Commons in favour of the military action 
before the invasion commenced,36  there was no vote before the RAF used force in 
Libya, although the leader of the opposition , Ed Miliband,  did offer his party’s 
support.37   
The UK’s deployment of force to Libya has reignited the debate sparked by the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, about whether there needs to be a formalised convention (a ‘war 
powers’ resolution) or even an Act of Parliament enshrining Parliament’s right to have 
a say in the deployment of troops, which still remains a prerogative power of the 
executive in the UK.38 Even if this happens the content of any normative framework 
purporting to govern such decisions will contain exceptions for necessity, for example 
where the use of force is unavoidable (‘leaving no choice of means or no moment for 
deliberation’),39 either in self-defence or in cases of humanitarian necessity. 
                                                          
35 Hansard HC, Vol. 525, Col. 613, 18 March 2011. 
36 Hansard HC, Vol. 401, cols 906-11, 18 March 2003. 
37 Hansard, HC, Vol. 525, Col. 615, 18 March 2011. 
38 Graham Allen MP raised the issue on the 21 March in a substantive debate two days after force had 
been used by the UK by stating that this ‘House is not taking any decisions: the Government have already 
taken a decision and have graciously allowed us a debate today. Does he agree that if we are to ensure 
that we stay properly informed, which the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition have both talked 
about, we need to resolve the question of the House's rights in respect of when this country goes to war? 
As we are the elected Chamber there ought to be something in our Standing Orders or in the Cabinet 
manual or some other place that gives the Chamber the right to be consulted before or after an action 
takes place’. David Winnick MP stated ‘I wish we could have had this debate before military action had 
been taken. I referred to that on a point of order and do not want to dwell on it because time is very short, 
but we must establish that, when military action is going to be taken, the House of Commons should 
debate the issue first. There is no doubt what the result of any vote tonight will be, and there would have 
been no difference if one had taken place on Saturday, but it would have been better if the House had so 
decided’.  Foreign Secretary William Hague responded  that ‘We will … enshrine in law for the future 
the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action’ (Hansard HC, Vol. 525,  Cols. 739, 752, 799, 
21 March 2011).  
39 Following the criteria in the Caroline incident of 1837 – 29 British and Foreign State Papers 1137-8; 
30 British and State Papers 195-6.   
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The prospect of enshrining the constitutional process of troop deployment in an Act of 
Parliament raises the prospect of judicial review of decisions to go to war, which may 
help ensure that Parliament scrutinises the legality of any decision very carefully and is 
prepared not to vote for any proposed deployment or use of force that has no grounding 
in international law. But to do this Parliament must be given full legal advice, otherwise 
it is being asked to vote for a decision without being given the necessary information.  
However, the prospect, even if a distant one, of the Courts becoming involved in issues 
of troop deployment will probably deter MPs from voting for such a piece of legislation, 
therefore making a non-statutory war powers resolution the more realistic option. This 
would still instil a necessary democratic balance to conflict decision-making, but also 
would enable MPs to consider the legality as well as the wider objectives of the 
proposed war.  They might if given clear and full legal opinion decide to vote against a 
war if the legality is doubtful; though they might disregard those legal doubts if it was 
felt that a use of force may not be clearly lawful but was nevertheless legitimate,40 and 
they could do so without fear of being subject to judicial review. But again to be able 
to make this informed choice MPs must have full access to clear and comprehensive 
legal advice. By these means international law should become an important determining 
factor in political decisions to go to war or otherwise to use force, which is surely a 
positive, indeed unarguable, development.  As yet, a war powers resolution remains 
unadopted.41 
In contrast to debates during the build-up towards NATO’s previous humanitarian-
inspired bombing campaign in 1999 over Kosovo, when the UNSC was blocked by 
China and Russia, the Prime Minister saw the abstention of China and Russia on 
Resolution 1973 as a positive step forward for international law, stating that this would 
not have occurred in the past;42 thereby suggesting the possible dawn of a new era of 
humanitarian intervention under UN authority. This issue was taken further when there 
was a full debate in the House on a substantive motion on Monday 21 March, two days 
                                                          
40 This was essentially the view of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in its review of 
the Kosovo operation in 1999 – Hansard HC, Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report 1999-2000, HC 
28-I, para.124-44 , 7 June 2000. 
41 In its report on the subject the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of 
Commons recommended that ‘the Government should as a first step bring forward a draft detailed 
parliamentary resolution, for consultation with us among others, and for debate and decision by the end 
of 2011’, See Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Eighth Report, ‘Parliament’s Role in 
Conflict Decisions’, 17 May 2011. 
42 Hansard HC, Vol. 525, Col. 627, 18 March 2011. 
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after the RAF had become involved in the military action over Libya. The substantive 
motion debated and voted upon welcomed UNSC Resolution 1973, indicated that there 
was humanitarian necessity, regional support and a clear legal basis for action, and 
therefore supported the government in taking necessary measures to protect civilians 
and enforce the no-fly zone.43 When asked why not intervene in other countries as well 
where on-going repression of discontent was brutal (Yemen was the example given),44 
the Prime Minister replied that ‘because we cannot do the right thing everywhere does 
not mean we should not do it when we have clear permission for and a national interest 
in doing so’.45 He finished by saying that ‘this is not going into a country and knocking 
over its Government, and then owning and being responsible for everything that 
happens subsequently. This is about protecting people and giving the Libyan people a 
chance to reshape their country’. He made it clear that UNSC Resolution 1973 
‘explicitly does not provide legal authority for action to bring about Gaddafi's removal 
from power by military means’.46  
In order to emphasise the limited nature of the intervention and the desire to keep within 
the bounds of the law Foreign Secretary William Hague stated at the outset of the air 
campaign on 21 March 2011 that:  
‘We are clear that we are engaged in this action to protect the civilian population 
and we were clear, as last week went on, that we had to act with all possible 
speed. That is why we moved heaven and earth, diplomatically, to pass the UN 
resolution on Thursday night. Yes, we took a risk in doing that because nine 
positive votes are required in the Security Council and there can be no vetoes. 
To have been defeated on that resolution would have made it hard to take any 
subsequent action, but any later would have been too late. Once the resolution 
was passed, we had to move with all possible speed. As the House knows, the 
Cabinet met on Friday morning to consider the UN resolution at length, with 
the legal advice of the Attorney-General in front of us for all members to read, 
and the Prime Minister came to the House at the earliest possible moment to 
state our intention. Some hon. Members have asked whether the House should 
                                                          
43 Hansard HC, Vol. 525, Col. 700, 21 March 2011 (David Cameron MP). 
44 Ibid., Col. 708, 21 March 2011 (Andrew George MP). 
45 Ibid., (David Cameron MP). 
46 Ibid., Col. 710-13. 
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have sat on Saturday to consider the motion; of course, in future instances, that 
can be considered, but they should be clear that to effect the situation, we had 
to give the orders for military action on Saturday afternoon. Other hon. 
Members have asked that there be no mission creep. I am happy to assure them 
that if the Government ever fundamentally change the nature of the mission that 
we have described to the House, we will return to the House for a further debate 
to consult it again’.47 
 The motion was adopted by 557 votes to 13.   
The matter returned to Parliament on a number of occasions in the period under review 
(until the end of June 2011), but no further votes were taken despite significant changes 
of events on the ground and an increasing range of targets being hit by NATO forces, 
including Colonel Gaddafi’s compound.  In these debates the government was very 
forceful in its statements that the military action was being taken to fulfil the purposes 
of UNSC Resolution 1973 in order to stop an ‘Arab Srebrenica’ in Benghazi,48 and then 
the protection of civilians which remained the aim of the operation though the 
government left no doubt that the future of Libya was without Gaddafi. 49 The concerns 
of some Members of Parliament that the government was deliberately going beyond the 
terms of the Resolution and that such mission creep should lead to the government 
seeking fresh Parliamentary endorsement did not prevail in the period under review. 
When the Foreign Secretary was reminded of the Prime Minister’s statement to the 
House of Commons of 21 March 2011 that UNSC Resolution 1973 did not allow for 
the removal of Gaddafi by military means,50 William Hague stated that the ‘military 
mission remains defined by the UN Security Council resolution, and there has been no 
change in the Government's approach to that’. He also made it clear that another UNSC 
Resolution was unlikely as was the need for a further vote in the House of Commons,51 
thus removing the need for proper accountability for British military actions at both 
international and national levels. Given that the military action in Libya derives its 
constitutionality as well as its legitimacy from the UNSC at the international level, and 
                                                          
47 Ibid., Col. 799 (William Hague MP). 
48 Hansard HC, Vol. 526, Col. 920, 5 April 2011 (Andrew Mitchell MP). 
49 Ibid., Col. 966. 
50 Hansard HC Vol. 527, Col. 37, 26 April 2011 (Douglas Alexander MP). 
51 Hansard HC Vol. 527, Cols. 40, 47, 50, 26 April 2011. 
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the House of Commons at national level, such responses,52 though entirely predictable, 
suggest less progress has been made since the Iraq crisis of 2003 than was commonly 
perceived at the time UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted. 
   
4. Conclusion: Lessons Learned or Lessons Ignored? 
What such debates in the House of Commons on Libya showed was a government intent 
on not making the same mistakes as the previous government did in relation to Iraq in 
2003, by securing UN authority for the use of force and by limiting the use of force to 
that necessary for the protection of civilians, thereby bringing itself at least initially 
fully within the jus ad bellum as well as the wider political consensus of there being a 
responsibility to protect when genocide or crimes against humanity are being 
committed. The swiftness of the diplomacy to secure an authorizing resolution from the 
UNSC, and support from the House of Commons, was driven by humanitarian necessity 
– to have waited any longer would have led to the destruction of Benghazi and the 
potential deaths of thousands of civilians.  
However, as with the more traditional doctrines of humanitarian intervention, this 
‘responsibility’ did not stretch to other countries in the Middle East where violent 
repression was prevalent. It may be that the determination in Resolution1970 that there 
was evidence of crimes against humanity being committed in Libya distinguishes that 
country from other Arab countries, though there was no attempt to determine whether 
such crimes had been  committed elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East during 
the so called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011. Selectivity is still the order of the day in the UN 
collective security system, but at least there was much greater effort to keep the military 
action within the parameters of international law. At the time of writing (towards the 
end of June 2011), the problem was that the longer the civil war in Libya continued, 
and the more NATO wanted to end it, the more problematic the military action became 
in reconciling it with the terms of Resolution 1973. The British government could bring 
the issue back to Parliament if it wished domestic approval to change its military 
strategy and tactics to include for instance ground troops (though by the end of June it 
                                                          
52 Repeated by government ministers - Hansard HC Vol. 528, Cols. 3-4, 16 May 2011 (Liam Fox MP); 
Hansard HC Vol. 528, Cols. 779-84, 24 May 2011 (Nick Harvey MP); Hansard HC Vol. 529, Col. 628, 
14 June 2011 (William Hague MP). 
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had not done so at least by any formal vote), and further it could seek agreement with 
its allies and in NATO, but unless another UNSC resolution was sought and secured,53 
that military action would not then be authorized by the very body under which the UK 
and NATO were purporting to act – the UNSC.  
The further in time the military action against Libya stretched away from UNSC 
Resolution 1973 adopted on 17 March 2011, the further it seemed to depart from the 
level of force authorised by that Resolution. Resolution 1973 was intended to authorise 
military action to prevent imminent attacks on Benghazi and other centres of civilian 
population such as Misrata. Instead of making it clear to Colonel Gaddafi and his forces, 
by statements and by action, that attacks or threats of attacks on civilian targets would 
not be tolerated, NATO, led by France and the UK, increasingly engaged government 
forces in a coordinated effort with rebel forces to defeat government forces and dislodge 
Gaddafi from power. The response to the crisis moved from an immediate and 
necessary protection of civilians towards regime change, illustrating that the UN 
collective security system does not appear to be capable of governing or regulating the 
use of force, even force which was initially taken under its authority, so that attaining a 
legally-grounded UN collective security system increasingly seems as far away in 2011 
at it did in 2003.  
  
                                                          
53 ‘Libya Conflict: France Eyes another UN Resolution’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
13096829,15 April 2011. 
